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17. International Law and Transboundary Aquifers
Gabriel E. Eckstein

Abstract
Although international law applicable to transboundary aquifers is still in an early stage of
development, ground water resources on nation’s frontiers are now garnering growing
international attention. This article examines the chief formal and informal mechanisms
that have been proposed or implemented for the assessment, use, allocation, and protection
of transboundary aquifers and identifies the legal trends and priorities emerging from
these instruments. It also considers gaps and shortcomings in the emerging administrative
regime and offers recommendations for the further development of the law.

Introduction
Growing demands for fresh water resources coupled with declining supplies have
exacerbated water scarcity around the world. As a result, many nations are focusing
their attention on ground water supplies in order to meet their societal, economic, and
environmental needs and objectives. Not surprising, they are finding that many of these
subsurface water bodies are shared with their neighbors and pose unique
transboundary political, social, and legal issues. This phenomenon is particularly
evident in the Middle East where the use and allocation of aquifers traversing political
boundaries, such as the Mountain Aquifer shared by Israelis and Palestinians and the
Nubian Sandstone Aquifer shared by Chad, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, continue to be a
source of friction among overlying riparians.
At present, there are few concrete rules under international law that govern relations
over cross-border ground water resources. The growing interest in transboundary
aquifers, however, is spurring discussions and inquiry about the appropriate rules and
mechanisms for exploiting and managing these buried treasures. Moreover, as nations
around the world begin to extract (or intensify their withdrawals of) ground water from
aquifers traversing national borders, they are beginning to explore and experiment with
various approaches to address rights and obligations pertaining to these shared
subsurface resources. As a result, while state practice in and scholarly analyses of the
utilisation of transboundary aquifers are still relatively sparse, trends and priorities are
beginning to emerge.
In an effort to identify and characterise these trends and priorities, this study reviews
the chief formal and informal mechanisms that have been proposed or implemented for
the assessment, use, allocation, and protection of transboundary ground water

resources. The study begins by addressing the importance of transboundary aquifers as
a source of fresh water for people and the environment. It then examines a number of
formal and informal arrangements between nations for the assessment, use, allocation,
and protection of transboundary ground water resources. By studying these regimes,
this article attempts to identify trends and priorities that may implicate the emergence
of generally accepted international legal norms applicable to transboundary aquifers.
This study concludes that while the law of transboundary aquifers is in an early stage of
development, there is, nonetheless, a growing body of experience and practice
suggesting the emergence of legal standards. Lastly, the article considers the gaps and
shortcomings in the emerging international regulatory system and offers
recommendations for the further development of the law.
Scope and significance of transboundary aquifers around the world
Transboundary ground water resources play a critical role in providing fresh water for
people, industries, nations, and the environment worldwide. This is especially true in
the arid and semi-arid regions of the world where transboundary aquifers often serve
as the primary or sole source of freshwater for human and environmental sustenance.
Libya, for example, which has no meaningful surface water resources, obtains the
majority of its fresh water – some 6.5 million cubic meters of water daily – from the
Nubian Sandstone Aquifer, a vast underground reservoir that also underlies sections of
Libya’s neighbours: Chad, Egypt, and Sudan (Watkins, 2006). Similarly, Palestinians in
the West Bank and Gaza obtain the great majority of their water from aquifers shared
with Israel – the Mountain Aquifer underlying the West Bank and eastern Israel, and the
Coastal Aquifer underlying Gaza’s and Israel’s Mediterranean coast (World Bank, 2009).
In addition, transboundary aquifers serve as the sole source of fresh water for many of
the communities along the Mexico-United States border, including the Mexican cities of
Puerto Palomas, Naco, Nogales, Sonoyta, and Tecate, and their respective American
sister cities of Columbus, Bisbee, Nogales, Lukeville, and Tecate (Eckstein, 2012).
Although the precise global significance and impact of these shared resources has
escaped quantification, extrapolations from relevant studies and comparisons support
the proposition that transboundary aquifers have become critical to human, economic,
and environmental sustainability worldwide. For example, ground water today is the
most extracted natural resource on the globe and provides water for twenty percent of
irrigated agriculture, as well as more than half of humanity’s freshwater for everyday
uses such as drinking, cooking, and hygiene (Water for People 2003). Moreover, while
276 international watercourses traverse the world’s international political boundaries
(Wouters and Moynihan 2013), an ongoing study has identified more than 600 aquifers
and aquifer bodies traversing the same frontiers (IGRAC 2015). Furthermore, while an
estimated forty percent of the world’s population reside in transboundary river basins
around the world (UN Environmental Programme 2002), given that most domestic and
internationally transboundary rivers have a hydraulically connected aquifer, and that

there are scores of solitary fossil aquifers around the world that likewise traverse
international political boundaries, it is logical to infer that a comparable if not larger
number of people reside in the basins of transboundary aquifers globally.
Despite the relevance of transboundary aquifers to human existence, economic
development, and environmental sustainability, policy and legal attention to these
subsurface resources is a relatively recent phenomenon. While over 3,600 treaties
relating to the use of transboundary surface waters have been catalogued since 805 CE,
and over 400 since 1820 (Wolf 2002), the first agreement to focus exclusively on the
management of a transboundary aquifer occurred in 1978 for the Genevese Aquifer
along the French-Swiss border (Genevese Convention, 2008).
Since then, greater attention has been focused on ground water resources traversing
international boundaries and the legal, policy, and political considerations that pertain
to these international water bodies. In addition to the Genevese Convention, a small
handful of formal and informal arrangements have been forged for a number of other
transboundary aquifers, including: the Guarani Aquifer in South America, the Nubian
Sandstone and North Western Sahara aquifer systems in Northern Africa, the Al-Sag/AlDisi Aquifer shared between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the Iullemeden and
Taoudeni/Tanezrouft aquifer systems in West Africa, the Hueco Bolson aquifer
underlying the cities of Juárez and El Paso on the Mexico-US border, and the
Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer between the US state of Washington and the Canadian
province of British Columbia. In addition, transboundary ground water resources have
featured prominently in the 1992 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes (1992 UNECE Water Convention), and the 1997 UN Convention on
the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997 UN Watercourses
Convention).
Especially prominent in this evolutionary process are two documents proffering
possible norms for administering transboundary ground water resources. The first are
the nineteen draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers (Draft Articles) prepared
by the UN International Law Commission (UNILC) and submitted to the UN General
Assembly (UNGA) in 2008. The second are the nine Model Provisions on Transboundary
Groundwaters (Model Provisions) that were prepared under the auspices of the UNECE
(Model Provisions 2014). While the outcome of the Draft Articles before the UNGA is
still unresolved and the Model Provisions were intentionally proposed as exemplars, the
two efforts represent significant milestones in the growing importance of
transboundary aquifers on the international agenda. Concerns over aquifers shared by
multiple nations are no longer secondary to those of surface water resources.
Transboundary aquifers have come into their own and are now legitimate topics of
international law, policy, and relations.

Examples of cooperative mechanisms for transboundary aquifers
References to transboundary ground water resources have appeared in international
instruments for more than 150 years. For example, an 1864 agreement between
Portugal and Spain afforded both parties the common rights to springs located on the
border (Treaty of Limits between Portugal and Spain, 1864). Similarly, an 1888
agreement between the United Kingdom and France provided both parties the common
rights to use the wells of Hadou, which lay on the newly created border of the Somali
coast. All of these references, however, were secondary or even tertiary concerns under
their respective agreement. It wasn’t until the late twentieth century that
transboundary aquifers began garnering an interest warranting individualized attention
in both treaty-making and international law.
The following section summarizes the chief formal and informal mechanisms that have
been proposed or implemented on a transboundary aquifer. All but three of these
arrangements are exclusively focused on aquifers. While the other three arrangements
address other water resources, they are included in this study because of their
relevance and emphasis on a particular transboundary aquifer as a primary concern.
Formal Agreements
The best known, and still the only treaty crafted to manage and specifically allocate the
waters of a transboundary aquifer, is the Convention on the Protection, Utilization,
Recharge and Monitoring of the Franco-Swiss Genevese Aquifer (Genevese Convention,
2008). Originated in 1978 and revised in 2008, this singular arrangement addresses
ground water quality, quantity, abstraction, and recharge largely through the creation of
a joint Genevese Aquifer Management Commission. While the Commission only has
consultative status, its recommendations and technical opinions carry considerable
weight in the management of the aquifer. In addition, the updated regime reasserts the
Swiss artificial recharge obligations created by the original 1978 agreement, allocates
expenses between the countries for the Swiss recharge efforts, and places strict
withdrawals limits on extraction in France (see Preamble, Articles 2.3, 8, 11-14, and
Annex to the Convention on the Inventory of the recharge equipment and existing
extraction works). The Genevese Convention is particularly significant because it strikes
a balance between state sovereignty and state responsibility in its management scheme,
which is based almost exclusively on principles of transparency, good faith dealings, and
cooperation. Moreover, the agreement is unique in its structure as a treaty since it
provides purely technical mechanisms for managing the shared aquifer and avoids any
direct political, legal, or other reference to either country’s sovereign rights to the
aquifer or its waters (Genevese Convention, 2008).
The newest arrangement for a transboundary aquifer is the 2015 Agreement between
the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the Kingdom

of Saudi Arabia for the Management and Utilization of the Ground Waters in the AlSag/Al-Disi Layer (Al-Sag/Al-Disi Agreement, 2015). In contrast to the Genevese
Convention, the Al-Sag/Al-Disi Agreement was created for the limited purpose of
restricting ground water extraction and protecting ground water quality. While it
imposes no numerical limitations on abstraction, the agreement creates a “Protected
Area” or buffer zone in both countries from which ground water extraction is absolutely
prohibited, as well as a broader “Management Area” from which extractions are
restricted exclusively for municipal purposes. In a similar restrictive vein, the
agreement places a near absolute prohibition on ground water pollution within the
Management Area. Also significant is the Al-Sag/Al-Disi Agreement’s creation of a Joint
Technical Committee (JTC), which like the Genevese Commission, does not have any
decision-making authority (Al-Sag/Al-Disi Agreement, 2015). While the JTC is
responsible for monitoring both the quantity and quality of extractions, collecting and
exchanging information, analyzing collected data, and submitting their findings to the
competent authorities in both nations, it is yet unclear whether it will enjoy a strong
consultative role as does the Genevese Commission.
Similar in concept to the Al-Sag/Al-Disi Agreement, the 1973 amendment to the 1944
Mexico-US Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers
and of the Rio Grande known as Minute 242 also focused on restrictions to ground water
extractions on the border (Minute 242, 1973). While the Minute was designed to
address salinity levels in the Colorado River, paragraphs five and six deviated from that
purpose and focused on ground water in the Arizona-Sonora border region near San
Luis. Paragraph five limits ground water pumping in this region to specifically
enumerated withdrawal targets, while paragraph six requires both countries to consult
each other prior to pursuing new development of surface or ground water resources
anywhere on the border that could have adverse transboundary impacts (Minute 242,
1973). While paragraph five also referenced the future development of a border-wide
ground water agreement, that arrangement has yet to be realised.
Taking a more generalist approach, the 2009 Agreement on the Guarani Aquifer –
entered into by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay – provides a basic framework
for cooperating over the Guarani Aquifer (Guarani Agreement 2009). While the
agreement references a number of broadly accepted substantive principles of
international water law, including those of reasonable and equitable use (Articles 3 & 4)
and of no significant harm (Articles 3, 6, & 7), it does not elaborate on their definition or
implementation. For example, the agreement does not identify the factors relevant to
assessing whether a particular use is reasonable and equitable. In the same vein, the
Guarani Agreement references various procedural obligations using vague terminology
and qualifications, including those for sharing information (Articles 8, 9 & 12),
providing notification of planned measures that may result in a transboundary impact
(Articles 9, 10, & 11), and the creation of a commission to oversee cooperation (Article
15). For example, in obligating the sharing of information, Article 8 qualifies the

requirement by requiring the Parties to “proceed to adequately exchange technical
information about studies, activities and works that contemplate the sustainable use of
the Guarani Aquifer System water resources” (Guarani Agreement 2009). While these
formulations might be regarded as creating ambiguous obligations, they may also be
perceived as creating a necessarily flexible framework for cooperation (Sindico &
Hawkins, 2015).
The most provocative aspect of the Guarani Agreement is its endorsement of state
sovereignty over portions of the aquifer that underlay each nation (Article 2). While
some assert that this language harkens back to the long-discredited Harmon Doctrine
and is scientifically and politically indefensible (McCaffrey, 2011), others contend that
the approach follows on the international notion of state sovereignty over natural
resources and was necessary to achieve dialogue over this nascent topic (Villar &
Ribeiro, 2013). Notwithstanding its implications for evolving international law for
transboundary aquifers, the Guarani Agreement has still not entered into force. While
Uruguay and Argentina have ratified the instrument, Paraguay and Brazil have yet to do
so.
Two additional arrangements must be considered when discussing formal mechanisms
developed for addressing shared ground water resources. The first is actually a series of
agreements entered into for the management of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer in
Norther Africa. The series begins with the 1992 Constitution of the Joint Authority for the
Study and Development of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer Waters (NSA Constitution
1992), which created a cooperative mechanisms designed to collect and compile
information on the aquifer, promote cooperation, and develop common water
management policies. That instrument was followed in 2000 by two agreements under
the framework of a Programme for the Development of a Regional Strategy for the
Utilisation of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (NSAS Agreements 2000). Under the
first agreement – Agreement No. 1 - Terms of Reference for the Monitoring and Exchange
of Groundwater Information of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System, done in Tripoli – the
four Parties consent to share via an Internet portal data that had been previously
compiled in the Nubian Aquifer Regional Information System, as well as information on
developmental aspects related to the aquifer, such as socio-economic data,
environmental issues, drilling experiences, meteorological data, and other data. Under
the second agreement – Agreement No. 2 - Terms of Reference for Monitoring and Data
Sharing, done in Tripoli – the Parties agree to continuously update this information by
monitoring the aquifer through specified studies, measurements, and analyses (NSAS
Agreements 2000).
The second noteworthy arrangement, which was implemented in 2002, is entitled
Establishment of a Consultation Mechanism for the Northwestern Sahara Aquifer System
(NWSAS Agreement 2002). This second North African arrangement creates a regime
whose mandate is to “coordinate, promote and facilitate the rational management of the

NWSAS water resources.” As part of its duties, the Consultative Mechanism must: (a)
manage a hydrogeologic database and simulation model; (b) develop and oversee a
reference observation network; (c) process, analyse, and validate data relating to
knowledge of the NWSAS; (d) develop databases on socio-economic activities in the
region related to water uses; (e) develop and publish indicators on the NWSAS and its
uses; (f) promote and facilitate joint or coordinated studies and research; (g) formulate
and implement training programs; (h) regularly update the NWSAS model; and (i)
develop proposals for the continued evolution of the consultation mechanism.
Informal Arrangements
Formal agreements are not the only evidence of trends and priorities in the
development of customary international law.i State conduct in the form of informal
arrangements can also serve as indications of emerging State practice.
One of the more fascinating arrangements is the 2014 Memorandum of Understanding
for the Establishment of a Consultation Mechanism for the Integrated Management of the
Water Resources of the Iullemeden, Taoudeni/Tanezrouft Aquifer System (ITAS) entered
into by Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria (ITAS MoU,
2014).ii As noted by its title, the focus of this arrangement is on the creation of a
Consultative Mechanism tasked with promoting cooperation over the management of
both the Iullemeden Aquifer System and the Taoudeni/Tanezrouft Aquifer System.
More specifically, the Mechanism is responsible inter alia for: conducting joint studies;
formulating recommendations for harmonizing water-related legislative, institutional
and management framework, as well as procedures and policies; and settling disputes
between the Parties (Article 5). In contrast to the purely consultative status of the
Genevese Aquifer Management Commission and the Joint Technical Committee under
the Al-Sag/Al-Disi Agreement, or the unclear status of the commission under the
Guarani Agreement, the Consultative Mechanism under the ITAS MoU has legal
personality and authority to contract, acquire and dispose of property, seek and obtain
loans, gifts, and technical assistance, and be a party in legal proceedings (Article 6). In
addition, and in stark contrast to the Genevese Convention, the ITAS MoU explicitly
relies on the well-known international water and environmental law principles of
equitable and reasonable utilisation, no harm, exchange of data and information, prior
notification, protection of the environment, public participation, precautionary
approach, and polluter and user pays (see Articles 13-14, 18-20, & 22-24). Unlike the
Guarani Agreement which merely referenced similar international principles, the ITAS
MoU offers considerable details on how these notions are to be construed and
implemented. Finally, akin to the Genevese Convention and in contrast to the Guarani
Agreement, the ITAS MoU emphasizes a balance between state sovereignty and state
responsibility and avoids any explicit mention of sovereignty in its formulation (ITAS
MoU 2014).

Another particularly unique informal arrangement is the 1999 Memorandum of
Understanding between the City of Juárez, Mexico Utilities and the El Paso Water Utilities
Public Services Board (PSP) of the City of El Paso, Texas (Juárez-El Paso MoU, 1999). This
mechanism is distinctive in that it was entered into by sub-national political entities
without the oversight of the respective federal governments. While legally unofficial and
unenforceable, the purpose of the Juárez-El Paso MoU is to encourage cooperation over
the management and exploitation of the Hueco Bolson Aquifer and the Rio Grande
River. It is also designed to facilitate the exchange of data and information, coordinate
joint projects, develop compatible plans to secure water supplies, and create an
Executive Committee tasked with fulfilling the objectives of the MoU. Given its parochial
origin and perspective, it may be understandable that the Juárez-El Paso MoU makes no
direct references to principles of international law or notions of sovereignty.
One other informal arrangement requires mentioning – the 1996 Memorandum of
Agreement Related to Referral of Water Right Applications (BC-WA MoA) entered into by
the Canadian province of British Columbia and the US State of Washington. Like the
Juárez-El Paso MoU, the BC-WA MoA was adopted by sub-national political entities
without the oversight of the respective federal governments. Moreover, like the JuárezEl Paso MoU, the BC-WA MoA was intended to encourage cooperation over a
transboundary aquifer, the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer along with other related fresh
water resources. The arrangement, however, is distinctive in that it calls for crossborder prior consultation, comment periods, and exchange of information on water
quantity allocations within each party’s territory that “could potentially significantly
impact water quantity on the other side of the border” (BC-WA MoA 1996). To the
extent that the BC-WA MoA applies to all surface water, ground water, and reservoir
waters, it facilitates a form of cross-border public participation over decision-making
related to shared water resources.
UNILC Draft Articles and UN ECE Model Provisions
The most profound milestones in the ongoing development of international law
applicable to transboundary aquifers are the nineteen Draft Articles prepared by the
UNILC, and the nine model provisions under the UN ECE Model Provisions.
UNILC Draft Articles
In late 2008, following six years of intense work, the UNILC submitted this workproduct to the UNGA. As a preliminary matter, the UNGA acknowledged the UNILC’s
efforts, issued a resolution commending the nineteen Draft Articles to the attention of
its Member States, and encouraged nations to take the articles into account when
entering into bilateral and regional arrangements pertaining to the management of
transboundary aquifers (UNGA Resolution 2008).

Modeled largely on the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, the chief substantive
obligations include the well-respected international watercourse rules of equitable and
reasonable utilization and no significant harm. In both instances, however, the
principles are tailored to the unique qualities that differentiate surface waters from
ground water resources. For example, the list of factors for assessing what constitutes
equitable and reasonable utilisation includes notions relevant to ground water
resources, such as “the natural characteristics of the aquifer or aquifer system,” “the
contribution to the formation and recharge of the aquifer or aquifer system,” and “the
role of the aquifer or aquifer system in the related ecosystem” (see Articles 5(1)(c), (d),
and (i), UNGA Resolution 2008). Likewise, the no significant harm rule obligates aquifer
states not to cause significant harm through “activities other than utilization of a
transboundary aquifer ... that have, or are likely to have, an impact upon that
transboundary aquifer” (see Article 6, UNGA Resolution 2008). This latter modification
specifically relates to the distinct likelihood that non-aquifer utilisation activities
undertaken above or around aquifers and their recharge and discharge zones could
have detrimental impacts on those subsurface water bodies. Activities contemplated by
this provision include industrial and agricultural operations in the recharge zone,
mining activities in the aquifer matrix, and construction, forestry, and other activities
that might affect the normal recharge or discharge processes (Eckstein, 2007).
Other notions found in the Draft Articles include obligations to regularly exchange data
and information, provide prior notification of planned activities, safeguard ecosystems,
protect recharge and discharge zones, prevent pollution, and monitor the aquifer (see
Articles 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 15) (UNGA Resolution 2008). Since their submission in
2008, the Draft Articles have appeared on the UNGA’s agenda in 2011 and 2013. Each
time, they were commended to the attention of UN Member States and tabled for a
subsequent meeting. Interestingly, in the 2013, the UNGA commended the articles “as
guidance for bilateral or regional agreements and arrangements for the proper
management of transboundary aquifers (Report of the Sixth Committee, 2013).” While
hardly a resounding endorsement, the “guidance” characterization suggests an elevated
status for the Draft Articles (Eckstein & Sindico, 2014). The Draft Articles are slated to
appear again on the UNGA’s agenda in late 2016.
UN ECE Model Provisions
The Model Provisions on Transboundary Groundwaters (Model Provisions), which were
finalised in 2012 under the auspices of the UNECE, were drafted to provide guidance to
states party to the UNECE Water Convention on the Convention’s relevance to ground
water resources. While the Model Provisions were designed to be non-obligatory, the
nine provisions were specifically aligned to the Water Convention and crafted to take
advantage of the binding regime established under that instrument. As a result, the
Model Provisions do not necessarily manifest new principles pertaining to
transboundary ground waters. Rather, they provide interpretative guidelines for and

facilitate the implementation of the UNECE Water Convention with regard to such water
bodies (Tanzi, et.al. 2015).
In reviewing the Model Provisions, it is clear that the authors drew some of their
inspiration from the Draft Articles. Like the Draft Articles, the Model Provisions give
considerable credence to the substantive obligations of equitable and reasonable
utilization and no significant harm (see Provision 1). They also endorse the procedural
obligations to regularly exchange data and information, monitor, prevent pollution, and
provide prior notification of planned activities (see Provisions 3, 5, 6, and 8). The Model
Provisions, however, also expand on the Draft Articles. For example, whereas the Draft
Articles merely recommended the creation of joint institutional mechanisms to carry
out the various objectives and obligations (see Articles 7 and 14), the Model Provisions
mandate the creation of such bodies (see Provision 9). Moreover, the Model Provisions
take the somewhat progressive steps of requiring that transboundary ground waters be
used in a sustainable manner (see Provision 2), and mandating that transboundary
ground and surface waters shall be managed in an integrated fashion (see Provision 4).
The status of international law for transboundary aquifers
The international law for managing and allocating transboundary ground water
resources is still in a nascent state. There is yet no global instrument or series of
customary norms that encapsulate the rules governing state conduct in this realm.
Nevertheless, there is a growing international interest in the subject matter, as well as
an increasing number of formal and informal arrangements between nations over
shared ground water resources. Taken as a whole, trends and priorities can be
discerned that could yet result in customary norms of international law. While the
extent of state practices relating to the management of transboundary aquifer is still
rather limited, a review of the arrangements discussed above hints at the emergence of
a number of norms.
Regular exchange of data and information
Possibly the most palpable and consistent conduct emerging from state practice is a
procedural obligation to regularly exchange data and information over transboundary
aquifers. Appearing in all but one of the arrangements discussed in this study, the duty
is fundamental to the sound management and protection of transboundary aquifers.
Absent such sharing of information, aquifer states are faced with the consequences of
the “blank map” syndrome whereby researchers on one or the other side of the border
are able to characterise and describe only the portion of the aquifer located within their
side (Sanchez, et.al. 2016). As a result, states are all-to-often unable to fully project and
mitigate any deleterious cross-border consequences that might result from the
utilisation of a particular transboundary aquifer (Eckstein 2007).

In order to fulfill this duty, both logic and emerging state practice suggest that aquifer
states should share on a continuing basis all available data and information on a
transboundary aquifer. The precise type of material that must be shared, however, is
not always spelled out in the various agreements. For example, the Al-Sag/Al-Disi
Agreement simply refers to, “The collection and exchange of information, statements
and studies and their analysis” (Al-Sag/Al-Disi Agreement, 2015), while the Model
Provisions reference “the exchange of information and available data on the condition of
transboundary groundwaters” (Model Provisions 2014). Nevertheless, it is obvious that
the type of material that should be exchanged would have to pertain to the character,
use, and functioning of the aquifer. Building on this reasoning, Article 8 of Draft Articles
provides that such data and information should include material of a “geological,
hydrogeological, hydrological, meteorological and ecological nature and related to the
hydrochemistry of the aquifers or aquifer systems, as well as related forecasts” (UNGA
Resolution 2008).
Using more aquifer-specific and descriptive language, the BC-WA MoA provides that the
Parties shall “cooperate in sharing relevant water quantity information necessary to
provide management of those water resources” and, subject to any domestic legal
restricting disclosure, “commit to freely sharing and exchanging information on” water
licenses and permits, as well as applications for new and modification of existing
licenses/permits, and regional water availability and development studies (BC-WA
MoA). Using equally focused language, the Juárez-El Paso MoU requires:
a) Sharing historical and current groundwater pumpage, sources of water, and water
quality data.
b) Sharing technical support and information.
c) Sharing knowledge and experience regarding funding including, grants and/or
loans, and determining the means by which to obtain such funds.
* * *
f) Sharing information and analyzing issues related to population growth and the
economy of the region to include in the regional planning processes, as well as
focus on long-term needs (funding for new water resources) on both sides of the
border.
(Juárez-El Paso MoU, 1999).
Monitoring and generation of supplemental data and information
A corollary procedural obligation to the duty to regularly exchange data and
information is the duty to generate supplemental data and information on an on-going
basis through monitoring and related activities. The obligation, which appears in a
considerable majority of the arrangements considered in this study, acknowledges the
need to maintain vigilance in managing a transboundary aquifer and, therefore, is also
indispensable to fulfilling the duty to exchange data and information.

The Genevese Convention, for example, is conceptualised largely on the notion of
monitoring and further developing information about the aquifer. For example, it
explicitly references monitoring in its title. Moreover, Chapter Four of the agreement
addresses “Quantitative and Qualitative Monitoring of the Resource” and mandates
periodic assessment of water quality and quantity as well as the exchange of that new
information, while Article 17 requires the Parties to “maintain a monitoring network …
intended for the issuance of warnings in the case of accidental pollution likely to affect
the water quality of the aquifer.” Moreover, Article 10 mandates that “data from the
extractions shall be performed by each user and reported at the end of the year to all
users”, while Article 16 provides that water pollution analyses “shall be made at regular
intervals” (Genevese Convention, 2008).
In a similar vein, Agreement No. 2 under the NSAS Agreements utilises “Monitoring and
Data Sharing” in its title and explicitly focuses on developing and exchanging new data
and information:
Hence, it is herewith agreed between the four countries … to monitor and share
among them the following information:
– Yearly extraction in every extraction site, specifying geographical location and
number of producing wells and springs in every site.
– Representative Electrical Conductivity measurements (EC), taken once a year
in each extraction site, followed by a complete chemical analysis if drastic
changes in salinity is [sic] observed.
– Water level measurements taken twice a year in the locations shown in the
attached maps and tables. The proposed monitoring network is subject to
changes upon the feedback of the National Coordinators of the concerned
countries.
Using more general language, Provision 3 of the Model Provisions discusses monitoring
in terms of “quantity and quality of transboundary groundwaters.” The Provision,
however, adds the critical requirements that the Parties must harmonise their
monitoring standards and methodologies, agree on assessment criteria and parameters
to be regularly monitored, and, where appropriate, link the monitoring of ground and
surface waters (Model Provisions 2014).
The obligation to monitor and continuously generate additional data accords with the
comparable duties imposed on riparians of transboundary surface waters. In his
separate opinion in the Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), Judge Christopher Weeramantry argued for
emergence of a principle of continuing environmental impact assessment. In that
opinion, Judge Weeramantry opined that “[a]s long as a project of some magnitude is in
operation, [an environmental impact assessment] must continue, for every such project
can have unexpected consequences; and considerations of prudence would point to the
need for continuous monitoring” (Gabčikovo Case, 1997, p. 111). More recently, in the

Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, the ICJ asserted that “once
operations have started and, where necessary, throughout the life of the project,
continuous monitoring of its effects on the environment shall be undertaken” (Pulp
Mills Case, 2010, p. 205). The Court again recognized that obligation in the combined
decision on the cases concerning Certain Activities Carried Out By Nicaragua in the
Border Area and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (San Juan
River Cases, 2015, p. 60). While all three cases recognised this recurring obligation in
the context of a transboundary watercourse, the logic utilised by the ICJ is equally and
undeniably pertinent to transboundary ground water resources.
Prior notification of planned activities
Another procedural obligation found in a majority of the above-noted instruments is the
duty to provide prior notification of planned activities. Where a planned project has the
potential to adversely affect either the territory of another aquifer state or the
transboundary aquifer itself, the acting state is obligated to notify other aquifer states of
its plans. The purpose of such obligations is to allow potentially affected states to
evaluate the possible consequences and to seek an understanding or compromise with
the acting state (Eckstein 2007).
While the precise procedures required under this concept vary among the instruments,
the basic notions of prior notification are well accepted in international water law.
Under Paragraph 6 of Minute 242, Mexico and the US agreed to “consult with each other
prior to undertaking any new development of either the surface or the groundwater
resources, or undertaking substantial modifications of present developments, in its own
territory in the border area that might adversely affect the other country” (Minute 242,
1973). Similarly, Article 15 of the Draft Articles would require aquifer states to provide
“timely” notification “accompanied by available technical data and information ... to
enable the notified State to evaluate the possible effects of the planned activities” (UNGA
Resolution 2008). Indirectly emphasising consultation in good faith, Article 11 of the
Guarani Agreement imposes the additional obligation that the party proposing the
actions that may have a transboundary impact must delay implementation of those
measures for at least six months while negotiating with the potentially affected state
(Guarani Agreement 2009). Moreover, Provision 8 of the Model Provisions mandates an
environmental impact assessment for all planned activities that are likely to have a
significant effect on transboundary ground water resources, and requires that the
assessment be transmitted to all potentially impacted state upon request (Model
Provisions 2014).
In contrast to the above instruments, the Iullemeden MoU proffers much more rigorous
requirements and processes for notification. While Article 27 provides the basic prior
notification obligation for “activities, policies and strategies, plans, programs and
projects proposed in the area, which may pose a risk to” the water resources of the

transboundary aquifer or otherwise cause transboundary adverse impacts, Article 31
calls for “technical data and information, including the results of any evaluation of the
environmental and social impact” to accompany the notification and requires the
notifying state to “refrain from implementing or permitting the implementation of the
planned measures” during a six month review process. Article 32 authorizes the
notifying state to proceed with the planned activity in the absence of a response to the
notification within six months. Article 33 requires that states engaged in consultations
and negotiations over planned measures must do so “according to the principle of good
faith, taking into account the legitimate interests of any other signatory State.” Article
34 permits potentially affected states to request a state engaging in planned measures
to comply with the notification obligations and requires disagreements on such
obligations to be pursued through consultation and negotiation. Finally, Article 34
allows planned measures to proceed without notifications in emergency situations
(Iullemeden MoU 2014).
Creation of institutional mechanisms to facilitate or implement the arrangement
One of the most interesting trends perceived from the various arrangements is the
creation of joint institutional mechanisms to carry out the objectives of the various
regimes. This is particularly noteworthy because of the 276 rivers and lakes found on
Earth, less than 40% (105) employ some type of water management institution
(Drieschova & Eckstein 2014). In contrast, of the handful of arrangements that have
been implemented or proposed for a transboundary aquifer, all but two have implement
or propose some type of joint institutional mechanism. Moreover, the Draft Articles in
Articles 7 (General obligation to cooperate) and Article 14 (Management), as well as the
Model Provisions in Provision 9, clearly contemplate the creation of such mechanisms.
While the structures and levels of authority granted these entities vary across the
regimes, it remains clear that most aquifer nations that have entered into a cross-border
arrangement recognize both the value of and the need for institutional and other
cooperative mechanisms to facilitate and realize the sound and sustainable
management of their shared ground water resources.
For example, the Model Provisions, Guarani Agreement, Al-Sag/Al-Disi Agreement, and
Juárez-El Paso MoU, all call for the creation of an institutional mechanism to carry out
the purposes of the respective agreements. The Model Provisions and Guarani
Agreement provide the simplest iteration of this obligation and offer no additional
instructions about the structure and operation of such an entity (Provision 9, Model
Provisions 2014; Article 15, Guarani Agreement 2010). The Guarani Agreement,
however, does provide in Article 15 that the mechanism would be established in
accordance with Article VI of the 1969 Treaty of the Plata River Basin, and stipulates in
Article 17 that it will be tasked with helping to resolve disputes by evaluation situations
and formulating recommendations (Guarani Agreement 2010). Article 3 of the AlSag/Al-Disi Agreement offers slightly more details and notes that the institutional

mechanism is composed of representatives of the national water resources agencies in
the two member states, and that its mandate includes: “The supervision and
observation” of ground water levels, quality, and extraction; “The collection and
exchange of information, statements and studies and their analysis” related to the
aquifer; and the submission of such information and analyses to the two governments
(Al-Sag/Al-Disi Agreement 2015). Likewise, the Executive Committee of the Juárez-El
Paso MoU is tasked in Paragraph 2 with data sharing and project coordination
obligations, and is also assigned to facilitate a number of locally-specific activities,
including completion of a feasibility study that was begun prior to implementation of
the MoU (Juárez-El Paso MoU 1999).
In a similar vein, the Genevese Convention creates a commission whose purpose is to
implement the agreement. The Genevese Aquifer Management Commission, however,
has more extensive authorities than under the above-noted arrangements. Its mandate,
for example, as described in Article 2, includes proposing an annual aquifer utilisation
program, providing technical opinions on construction of new ground water extraction
operations and modification of existing equipment, and performing audits of investment
and operational costs related to the recharge installation. It is also responsible for
overseeing waterworks and equipment construction (Article 5), record water
extractions (Article 6), collect water level and quality data (Article 10), establish water
quality analysis criteria (Article 16) (Genevese Convention 2008).
In contrast to the above five arrangements, where creation of a joint institution was an
important albeit a secondary component to the agreement, the NWSAS Agreement, the
Iullemeden MoU, and the Constitution of the Joint Authority, by their very titles and
purposes, were formulated and implemented specifically to create a joint cooperative
mechanism. The NWSAS Agreement, for example, created a “Consultative Mechanism”
to “coordinate, promote and facilitate the rational management of the NWSAS water
resources” (Parag. I, NWSAS Agreement 2002),” while the Iullemeden MoU created an
identically-named mechanism “to promote and foster cooperation between the
Signatory States … based on solidarity and reciprocity for a sustainable, equitable,
coordinated and collaborative use of the ITAS water resources” (Article 3, Iullemeden
MoU 2014). While the NSA Constitution does not include a purpose statement, the
“tasks” outlined in Article 3 of the agreement are representative of the functions and
responsibilities assigned to the mechanisms under each of these three agreements:
collect and develop all data and information relevant to the shared aquifer; promote and
facilitate additional studies; formulate proposals for the sustainable management of the
aquifer; and undertake and facilitate appropriate training programs and other
mechanisms for the disseminating of information (NSA Constitution 1992).
Substantive obligations

While the above obligations may properly be described as procedural in nature, the
various arrangements discussed here also endeavor to create a number of substantive
responsibilities. The most prolific of these is the Iullemeden MoU, which commits
Signatory States to such principles as: equitable and reasonable utilization, nondamaging use, sustainable development, ecosystem protection, precaution, and polluter
pays (Iullemeden MoU 2014).
A closer review of the arrangements, however, suggests no conclusive trends of crosscutting substantive norms emerging from such practices of states. Varying references to
adverse transboundary effects, impacts, and harm are found in two formal instruments
(Paragraph 6, Minute 242; Articles 6 & 7, Guarani Agreement), one informal mechanism
(Article 20, Iullemeden MoU), and both the Draft Articles (Article 6) and Model
Provisions (Provision 1). While Minute 242 simply refers to possible transboundary
“adverse effect” in the context of prior notification, the others impose a due diligence
obligation to prevent, control, and reduce such impacts. Of these five arrangements, all
except Minute 242 also refer to the cornerstone international water law principle of
equitable and reasonable utilization (Article 13, Iullemeden MoU; Article 4, Guarani
Agreement; Article 4, Draft Articles; and Provision 1, Model Provisions). However, only
the Iullemeden MoU and the Draft Articles offer factors to be taken into account when
assessing what uses may be deemed equitable and reasonable.
Aside from these few similarities, the lack of consistent appearance of additional
principles in the various instruments and mechanisms reviewed in this study indicates
that no other norms or obligations are trending toward customary status.
Notwithstanding, as the practice of states pertaining to transboundary aquifers
continues to evolve and new agreements are forged, this conclusion should be
periodically reevaluated.
Considerations for further development of the law
While surface and ground water resources are both integral components of the
hydrologic cycle and share numerous similarities, ground water possesses a number of
unique characteristics that must be considered carefully when contemplating
regulatory tools for managing the resource. For example, the relatively slower flow
rates of water through subsurface strata, as compared to water flow in rivers, can
impair an aquifer’s natural filtration abilities and, thereby, their capacities to reclaim
and cleanse themselves of pollutants. As a result, ground water can be more vulnerable
than surface water to agricultural, industrial, and municipal pollution as well as other
sources of contamination (Eckstein 2007). Moreover, because of the geographic extent
of most aquifers and the challenges associated with monitoring underground
formations, the artificial reclamation of a polluted aquifer can be prohibitively complex
and expensive. As a result, once an aquifer is contaminated, it may be rendered
unusable for years, decades or longer (Eckstein 2007). Among other issues, this raises

the question of whether the threshold for actionable harm should be different for
transboundary ground water resources as compared to cross-border surface water
bodies.
Furthermore, the “functioning” of aquifers – which refers to how particular aquifers
work or behave as aquifers – also must be taken into account when formulating
appropriate regulatory mechanisms for the sound management of transboundary
ground water resources. Aquifer functioning encompasses how subsurface strata can
store and transport water, dilute wastes and other contaminants, provide a habitat for
aquatic biota, serve as a source of fresh water and nutrients to aquifer-dependent
ecosystems, and even provide geothermal heat. Each of these characteristics is
dependent on the particular aquifer’s structure, hydrostatic pressure, hydraulic
conductivity, interaction with other geophysical phenomenon, and mineralogical,
biological, and chemical attributes. Moreover, all of these traits may be interdependent
to the extent that an aquifer’s sustained operation as a dynamic hydrogeologic system
depends on the continuation of a particular function or series of functions (Heath 2004).
If any of these natural characteristics were to be impaired or destroyed, it could
detrimentally affect the viability and integrity of the aquifer as a whole, as well as
communities and ecosystems dependent on that aquifer. Accordingly, in order to
manage a transboundary aquifer in ways that maximizes both its utility and
sustainability, regulatory mechanisms must take into account the functioning as well as
the unique vulnerabilities and characteristics of each shared subsurface water body.
In addition, when contemplating appropriate regulatory mechanisms for the sound
management of transboundary ground water resources, the recharge and discharge
processes of each aquifer also require special attention. Recharge and discharge zones
regulate the flow and quality of water moving into and out of aquifers. Hence, these
processes, as well as the geographical area in which they operate, must be properly
maintained and protected. In the case of recharge zones, this consists of ensuring both
the quantity and quality of water flowing through the recharge zone and entering the
aquifer. Thus, recharge zone protection might include restrictions on industrial and
municipal developments in the recharge area, as well as constraints on agricultural
activities that might contaminate the recharge area and, thereby, the aquifer. Similarly,
discharge zones protection could include restrictions on construction and other
activities that might inhibit the discharge process, water flow within the aquifer, the
location of the water table, or the aquifer’s natural cleansing abilities. Restrictions for
both zones might also include limitations on mining activities that remove or modify the
strata within the recharge or discharge area.
The above concerns do not reflect all of the characteristics, issues, and gaps in
knowledge that must be addressed. Others concerns and topics that should be
considered include: the relevance of the principles of no significant harm and equitable
and reasonable use to transboundary aquifers; if relevant, whether the no significant

harm standard is subordinate or superior to that of equitable and reasonable use in the
context of transboundary aquifers; mechanisms to harmonise metadata and
methodologies produced by aquifer riparians pertaining to a shared aquifer; whether
the exploitation of non-recharging aquifers, as compared to recharging aquifers, require
a distinct legal and governance regime.
Conclusion
Transboundary ground water resources today play a critical role in providing fresh
water for people, industries, nations and the environment worldwide. For billions of
people, they serve as the bulwark against the challenges posed by expanding demands
for freshwater and the declining supplies resulting from overexploitation and climatic
changes. As a result, transboundary aquifers are now receiving greater international
attention by overlying nations, non-governmental advocacy groups, and UN entities.
Moreover, many states around the world are beginning to pursue various strategies for
their exploitation and management.
While the level of attention that these aquifers are receiving still pales in comparison
with that paid to rivers and lakes, it is reasonable to expect that nations will continue to
explore their transboundray aquifers. The value of these resources is undeniable, and
growing water scarcity is driving many nations to investigate all new possibilities. As a
result, it is also reasonable to expect that more states will engage their cross-border
neighbors in an effort to collaborate and coordinate their activities. Moreover, as
cooperation over transboundary aquifers expands and the number of formal and
informal arrangements grows, as is certain to happen, trends and priorities will become
more evident and will lead to the development of more definite customary norms for
the management of transboundary ground water resources.
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Endnotes

i

Customary international law refers to international law that is based on the accepted practices of nations rather
than on codified rules. It emerges from the broad and consistent conduct of states that is undertaken by a belief
that such behavior is both legally appropriate and mandated (Brownlie, 1998).
ii

The ITAS MoU is considered here as an unofficial arrangement. Conceptualized as a Memorandum of
Understanding, the ITAS MoU technically cannot be deemed a binding instrument. Yet, in its final provisions, it
references the “binding” nature of decision taken by the Consultative Mechanism (Article 47) as well as the
need to ratify the MoU for it to enter into force (Article 53). Moreover, the details and language used in the
MoU suggest an intention by the parties to comply with the terms of the resulting agreement once it comes into
force. Notwithstanding, as of this writing, only Nigeria has processed the MoU’s ratification within its domestic
system (Nigeria Politics Online, 2014).

